PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION AND e-COMMUNICATION:

EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEABILITY OF THE CURRENT REGULATION TO THE NEW SCENARIOS OF TECHNOLOGY

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PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION AND e-COMMUNICATION

Introduction

- Object of the research:
 - Studying the legal framework in the field of Data Protection and the enforceability/implementation issues in the sector of e-Communication;
 - Finding out possible solutions → new technologies and fundamental rights: compatibility and prospects
 - <u>Directive n. 95/46/CE</u>: "...the functioning of an internal market requires not only that personal data should be able **to flow freely** from one Member State to another, but also that the fundamental rights of individuals should be safeguarded";
 - <u>Directive n. 2002/58/CE</u>: "...The successful cross-border development of these services is partly dependent on the **confidence** of users that their privacy will not be at risk".
 - The Data Protection regulation offers a good example of integration between juridical and technical rules

PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION AND e-COMMUNICATION

- Summary
- Privacy as fundamental right and its evolution in the 'Information Society';
- II) Legal framework;
- III) Personal Rights protection and technological potential: a balance of interests
- IV) A legal-technical approach: need to innovate the current juridical measures and to use the technologies as factors of protection

PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION AND e-COMMUNICATION

1)

Right to keep the control on our personal data against discrimination and *conditioning* in our decisions

→ the exercise of the rights depends also on the aware use of the own technical equipment

Data Protection and e-Democracy

- → "We can't separate the e-Government from the e-participation and there can not be e-participation without e-inclusion" (S. Rodotà 2006)
- → private life, market, politics are not necessary *in antitesi*

Need to put the person at the centre of the regulation → Chart of Nice

II) The legal framework

- European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (art. 8);
- Convention of Strasbourg n. 108/81;
- Directive n. 95/46/CE, "frame-directive"
- Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union 2000 (art. 7 and 8)
- <u>Directive n. 2002/58/CE</u> "e-Privacy"
 - <u>Italian Data Protection Code</u> (D.lgs.n.196/2003)
- Directive 2006/24/CE "Data Retention"
- + Soft Law → Self regulation (Code of practices) and technical rules

III) Enforceability of the D.P. regulation: the *Vicom project* www.vicom-project.com

→ an architecture for Virtual Immersive Communication Services

possible scenario: a campus

→ provision of personalized services and interaction with the environment

Main issues:

- The system uses personal data (need to assure a fair processing)
- Wireless Communication (presupposes the presence of cameras and sensors linked each others;
- Ambient Intelligence for the identification and localization of people and objects – miniaturization of the tools;
- Multimedia Virtual Contents (enrich the reality with ad hoc data)
- Spatial and functional intrusion; transparence; web presence
- Need to review the technical standards and architectures in order to preserve the right to privacy

- a) access to the campus
- b) inside the campus: the provision of services
- Fundamental principles and general rules (supranational and national regulation)
 - Fundamental rights and freedom; personal dignity and identity (Art 2 it. Code)
 - Necessity, proportionality, lawfulness, pertinence, purpose limitation (art. 6/7, directive 95/46/CE)
- > Specific rules:
 - Section X Italian Data Protection Code (e-Communication)
 - remedies (claim to the Garante or to the judicial authority)
 - Sanctions (civil, administrative and penal measures)

- a) access to the campus
 - The student (his personal agent) is automatically identified, localized, driven...(on the basis of the personal data gathered at the first access)
 - Necessity principle → the hardware and software must be made out reducing at minimum the use of identifiable data (Art 6 dir. 95/46)
 - Consent: free, specific, aware (Art 7 dir. 95/46; 18 it. Code):
 - different rules if the responsible of the data processing is a <u>public</u> body (exceptions only for institutional duties
 - ightarrow is it possible to talk of the Vicom services as 'institutional duties'?) or <u>private</u> subject (only in specific cases
 - → services are provided by a society which processes the student's data)
 - <u>Transparence</u> principle → obligation to inform of the presence of cameras and sensors

b) Inside the campus: the services provision

b1) the System knows the user's personal data

> Proportionality principle

→ Are the use of some kind of technical devices and **their functioning proportional** to the purpose of the processing (to provide for specific value-added services)?

Pertinence and not excess

- → (not pertinent data collected by a **Commune** for the investigation of crimes)
- → data related to the user's **tastes** can be excessive regarding the service provision

> Finality

- → specific, legitimate purposes (Garante 3/11/05 "*Telepass and free consent*")
- Data processed contra legem can not be more used

b2) the system knows in every moment the user's position (I)

- Traffic and location data (art 6,9 dir. 2002/58/CE):
 - → erased or made anonymous when no longer needed for the transmission of the communication (except for billing aims)
 - → subject to the **consent (revocable)**, their processing is allowed for marketing purposes and for the provision of value-added services
 - Opinion of EU Working Group (9/2004):
 - 1) unlimited retention of such data is unlawful
 - 2) answers to a specific need (judicial purposes)
 - Recent Data Retention directive n.24/2006/CE: new obligations
 - → available data for the purpose of investigation, prosecution of serious crimes
 - → retained for periods not less then 6 months and not more then 2 years
 - → enforcement before Sept.'07 (except for Internet data, 2009)

main issues:

proportionality and necessity of such huge retention; not authorized accesses

Opinions of EDPS (26/09/05) and of Art 29 WP (25/03/06)

- → possible solutions:
 - localize the user without identify him/her
 - use identification data, but with previous consent
 - chose 'Protected identification' (association with the specific subject only afterwards
- Freedom of choice → possibility to defuse the localization system
- Such processing must be **notified** to the national Authority (art 37 lt. Code)
- > On-line processing (the *Personal Agent* can be connected to **Internet**)
 - \rightarrow cookies, log files
 - → risk of hidden collection of data, monitoring and profiling for marketing purposes
 - Art 5 dir. 2002/58/CE: they are allowed only for lawful purposes, when necessary and with the informed **consent** of the user (given in different ways)

b3) the system uses a suitable number of sensors (I)

- •Videosurveillance Doc. Art 29 WP (02/11/2004)
- •Videosurveillance Act (Garante 04/29/'04): minimum requirements

Lawfulness → 'institutional duties' *for public entities*;

→ law requirement, consent, security purposes for privates;

Necessity → software made out *ab origine* in order to avoid identifiable data

Proportionality → the other measures are unsuitable: evaluated in every face (dislocation, visual angle, automatic zoom; interconnection of the system with others)

- → Garante (27/02/05): unlawful videosurveillance system for investigation of administrative infractions;
- →Garante (15/06/04): Commune: no video-recording for promotional aims **Finality** (public security ≠ profiling activity)
 - → Garante (04/05/'05): Cameras in the stadium justified for repeated violence

b3(II)

- > VIT used involve a processing that presents "specific risks" (art.17 It Code)
 - → obligation to ask the national Authority for a "previous check"

(videosurveillance systems, matching of images and other specific data such as biometric data or ID codes of smart cards or voice identification devices)

→ also in case of digital images and *dynamic-preventive videosurveillance*

- Specific modalities will be indicated in a Code of practice to be adopted (art. 134 lt. Code)
 - → administrative and criminal penalties (if there is a harm)

b3(III)

In case of software for the interpretation of gestures and facial recognition

- **Biometric data:** till now admitted for security purposes (public and private)
- → is their use "proportionate" to provide a value-added service?
 - ✓ Art 29 WP (Working doc. on biometrics 08/01/2003)
- → Garante: *extrema ratio* (independently from the consent);
 - → assiduity control at workplace; check of refectory service (Garante 16/12/04)
 - → Matching of biometric data and images only if exists an effective risk and if encrypted (Garante 17/11/05, access to a Bank)
 - → workers rights protection in the use of sensors: far control is forbidden (Garante 21/07/05,)
- > (art 14 lt. Code):
 - It is not allowed to adopt judicial or administrative acts based exclusively on a personal data processing aimed to the profiling

b IV) offering of personalized information

- Value-added services (suggestions on events/products of the campus etc.)
 - → "possible spam"?
 - not requested communications are allowed with: (art 13 dir. 2002/58/CE)
 - → previous **consent** and possibility to refuse them in every moment
 - → except for similar products or services already accepted
- Realistic representation (situation in the classroom, virtual driver guide)
 → preferable synthesized image (not identification)
- Virtual lesson → software for the interpretation of the gestures made out according the mentioned principles (anonimity,proportionality)

A legal technical-approach

- Determinant the contest in which the VIT are used (campus, airport, museum, restoration lab)
- Council of Europe Conference of Prague (October 2004):
 → interaction among normative (legislation and self-regulation) solutions and technological ones (diffusion of P.E.T.)
- International Conference DP Commissioners of London (November 2006)

A legal-technical approach

- Valid also for Rfid application and Ubiquitous Computing
- Drms and data protection → "conformed" technologies
- User's rights to exercize a control on his own terminal equipment

A Legal-techical approach

- > I) Rfid and smart labels
 - Applications: logistic; anti-piracy; clothes, travel documents, etc
 - → control on products is extended to the consumers' behaviours
 - → ubiquitous microchips for the data processing: dislocation
 - → risk that not authorized subjects rewrite the label
 - Art 29 WP doc. 01/19/2005; Garante 03/09/2005:
 - Indications against unlawful controls
 - Risks from the adoption of common standards
 - Realize at the technical level the exercise of the rights
 - → Guarantee the **visibility** and possibility to **defuse** the system

A Legal-technical approach

- II) DRMs and data protection
 - 'Collateral effects': **cultural** control and **privacy** invasion
 - Not necessary incompatible: the technology is neutral
 - → From the risk of privacy invasion to the possibility of privacy protection
 - Art 29 WP n.104 01/18/2005: DRMs compatible with data protection
 - Constant Identification of the user (through Unique Identifiers)
 - Tracing and monitoring a priori of single user's act → profiling
 - fundamental principles on data protection must be respected:
 → possibility to realize the 'protected anonymity' of the identifiers
 - Solutions:
 - → develop technical measures to **minimize** the use of personal data
 - → incorporate the privacy values in the DRMs → privacy-oriented architecture
 - → "build intellectual privacy into **law** and into **code**" (J.E.Cohen, Berkley TLJ,2003)

A legal-technical approach

- "Knowledge Society"
 - loss of autonomy with regard to personal decisions
 - ✓ need to make the technology relative
 - Compliance with necessity, proportionality, purpose limitation, transparency
 - ✓ Improve 'conformed' technologies and diffusion of P.E.T
 - → EU Comm. Report on on the first pplication of the directive 95/46/CE
 - → EU Comm. Communication on the diffusion of PET (05/02/2007)
- > **Effective** rights of the data subject:
 - The right to not be subjected to intrusive conditionings
 - The right to keep the control on the own terminal equipment
 - Autonomy of decision (which personal data reveal and when defuse the system)
- Make the users aware of their rights as well of the technical solutions for the data protection → make them responsible
- Come back to the original concept of privacy (data protection is not exhaustive)

A legal-technical approach

- New generation of law for a legal-technical approach
 - "Internormativité": dialogue between the juridical and not-juridical rules (social, ethic, technical)
 - → effectiveness, lawfulness, conformity (*criteria for juridical validity*)
 - Promoted by the EU doc. "better regulation" (2003)
 - Regulation not from outside but from inside the technology
 - The role of law: to define the public values (included privacy ones) that must be taken into account in the formulation of the technical standard
 - Co-regulation system: better choice (law finds effectiveness in the technical solutions and in the self-regulation ones)